Introduction
The study of policy processes is growing and diversifying both in numbers of scholars and in theoretical and methodological approaches. Scholars are increasingly developing established theories and creating new theories, studying public policies in a variety of contexts that span the globe, and applying a diversity of methodological and analytical techniques. If communication among policy scholars is essential for lesson learning and advancing the field then clear vocabulary lies at the fulcrum of progress. A key way to improve that communication process is to describe and compare, in great depth, the language of key concepts and theories.
To that end, the purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the conceptual definitions and theories associated with policy paradigms and ideas (Hall, 1993) with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; Sabatier, 1988) . The goal is not an integration but rather a communication between the two approaches to clarify some of the differences and similarities and to suggest areas and strategies for improvements and future research.
Challenges immediately arise, however, when comparing and contrasting Hall's (1993) policy paradigms and ideas to any other theoretical approach or concepts found in public policy. The source of the challenges lies in the obscure ontological origin of both paradigms and ideas, which manifests in overly stretched and poorly defined definitions that have befuddled communication and research among policy scholars for decades. As such, two sets of questions must continue to be asked. The first set is descriptive: what are ideas and paradigms and how do the definitions of ideas and paradigms relate? The second set is Both sets of questions about paradigms and ideas remain largely unanswered. The principal reason is that ideas and paradigms are ontologically obscure and, therefore, any attempt to draw explanatory leverage and generalizable knowledge will be problematic. Yet, scholars continue to study them. The popularity of ideas and paradigms stems probably from their intuitive appeal, for the concepts are flexible enough to capture the imagination of what is and what ought to be. Thus, policy scholars often adopt an 'I know it when I see it' approach. As a result, they see what they want to see in ideas and paradigms, and what they see is not always the same. Despite plenty of attention among talented scholars, the definitions and relationship among paradigms and ideas remain nearly as confusing and ambiguous today as they were more than two decades ago.
Given past efforts in attempting to clarify the meaning of paradigms and ideas and strengthening the theory involving paradigmatic policy change, this chapter takes a different path that involves an exploration of Halls' paradigms and ideas and the ACF. This exploration shows that, while some commonalities can be identified, non-trivial differences exist between the two approaches. It would be counterproductive to the study of policy processes to overlook the nuanced differences in the hope of building studies based on their similarities.
Descriptions of ideas and paradigms
For more than two decades, Hall (1993) has inspired and motivated scholars to clarify the elusive meaning of paradigms and ideas. Recognizing these past efforts and not wanting to replicate them, this section starts with a brief summary of Hall (1993) to enable a later comparison with the ACF. Fuller descriptions and interpretations of Hall (1993) can be found in this volume and in, for example, special issues devoted to his work (including Governance, 26, 2, 2013). Hall's (1993) article now commands 4,000 Google Scholar citations and has become a key reference point in the field. If scholars want to define a policy paradigm, or find a point of departure to present their own argument, they usually start with 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State'. Many discussions of ideas and paradigms start with this quote:
[P]olicymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm. (Hall, 1993, p. 279) Part of Hall's aim is to account for the role of ideas in policy processes (1993, p. 276) . This presents anyone with an immediate problem because the 'idea' concept is a very broad and not well-defined term (for examples of a wide variety of attempts, see Cairney, 2012, pp. 222-3) . Indeed, Cairney and Heikkila (2014, p. 365 ) seek a way to categorize both ideas and beliefs as
[w]ays of thinking or the knowledge that plays a role in the policy process. This [ideas] category may include beliefs, knowledge, worldviews, and shared definitions of policy problems, images, and solutions within groups, organizations, networks, and political systems. Some ideas or beliefs may be taken for granted or rarely questionedsuch as core beliefs, values, or paradigms. Others may be more malleable, such as proposed solutions to policy problems. Similar to Cairney and Heikkila's (2014) interpretation, a wide range of authors have used ideas as a way to identify the role of beliefs and give them analytically separate causal weight from 'interests' or 'power', which are also difficult to define satisfactorily. In some cases, the balance of explanation -or, at least, the focus -appears to be in favour of the independent role of ideas, such as when Richardson (2000, p. 1019) describes them as viruses which provide a 'shock to both existing institutional arrangements and the actors that benefit from them', Baumgartner and Jones (1993, p. 237) identify 'powerful forces of change that sweep through the entire system', and Axelrod argues that (1986, p. 1095) 'an established norm can have tremendous power' as a 'mechanism for regulating conflict in groups'. However, further inspection suggests that the role of individuals and their choices is crucial -as people show degrees of immunity to ideational viruses and resistance to framing policy problems, and can choose to challenge or reinforce norms. In other accounts, policymaking involves a battle between proponents of different policy 'narratives' (McBeth, Jones, & Shanahan, 2014) , or the 'social construction of target populations' (Schneider, Ingram, & deLeon, 2014) . While many different uses of ideas exist in the literature, the meanings and roles of ideas can be organized, initially, in three ways.
First, ideas relate to persuasion and argument, as resources in the policy process, alongside the use of material and other resources (Hall, 1993, pp. 291-2; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, pp. 44-5; Kettell & Cairney, 2010, p. 301; Kingdon, 1984, pp. 131-3; Majone, 1989, p. 2) . A large part of the literature considers the balance we need to strike between explaining outcomes in terms of material power and persuasion, before finding a way to say that both are important. This focus has strong links to a large literature on agenda setting, problem definition, and 'framing' (Cairney, 2012, pp. 182-7) .
Second, the meaning of ideas goes beyond persuasion. Ideas refer to a shared language, sometimes implicitly or explicitly by policy participants. This is in reference to Hall's (1993, p. 279 ) description of ideas as part of an abstract framework of terminology. It is also a definition that links ideas directly as constitutive components of policy paradigms. That is, ideas constitute policy paradigms but not all ideas are policy paradigms (Baumgartner, 2014) .
Third, the meaning of ideas is associated with the phrase 'I have an idea.' In other words, an idea refers to a proposed solution to a policy problem. This definition reflects the interpretation of ideas in Kingdon's policy stream. For example, when Kingdon (1984) starts his work with the following quote from Victor Hugo, 'Greater than the tread of might armies is an idea whose time has come', the reference is not in relation to any kind of value or belief but rather to a solution to a problem.
This interpretation of ideas in relation to paradigms suggests that solutions are not simply resources that people choose to use, and are able to promote through persuasion and argument. Rather, there is a ' structural' element to policy discussions; a paradigm provides the context in which people use arguments and persuasion and within which certain solutions are feasible or even conceivable. In one sense, this means manipulating language explicitly to present a persuasive argument. In another, it means using a language that everyone uses routinely, to the extent that they (almost) take it for granted. Consequently, one might exert power to frame a policy problem and propose an idea in the form of a solution or to use ideas to influence the discursive context in which that framing takes place. One might frequently challenge a policy, while a challenge to the whole system of policymaking is rare.
The interpretation and reinterpretation of Hall
There is also a diverse interpretation of paradigms which builds on, or reinterprets, the work of Hall (1993) . At times, these interpretations are similar to the three meanings we identify, but many have different emphases and potentially different meanings. One reading of Hall's (1993) definition would suggest, for example, that we should treat a paradigm as an encompassing gestalt, which exists independently of the people operating within it. This interpretation treats paradigms as something often unrecognized and implicit in shaping the thoughts, language, discourse and narratives, and political behaviour of everyone thinking and behaving therein.
Similar to the gestalt interpretation is one that focuses on structure and is akin to a set of institutions which help explain ways of thinking and regular patterns of behaviour in organizations and political systems. Consequently, our focus could be on who constructed the institutions, and in whose interests. This emphasis ties neatly to several discussions of system-wide power, including Gramscian notions of the construction of hegemony (1971; see Hindess, 1996, p. 5; Lukes, 2005, p. 27) , as well as the competition for 'cognitive control' -note the phrase 'le referential' (Jobert & Muller, 1987 ) which refers to a fundamental set of ideaswhich often look benign or innocuous -imposed by powerful elites (Genieys & Smyrl, 2008, p. 23) . From this definition of paradigms, policies or institutions that comprise them are translations or revealed ideas (Daigneault, 2014) .
In addition, the discussion of a 'structural' element to ideas links strongly to the study of institutions (i.e., rules, norms, and 'standard operating procedures') and 'new institutionalism'. This is partly a positive sign, since it brings together two potentially separate literatures, to aid the production of a common reference point for scholars, but also a problem, since it adds to terminological confusion in two main ways. First, although John (2003, p. 488 ; followed by Cairney & Heikkila, 2014; and Cairney, Studlar, & Mamudu, 2012) identifies commonality among major policy theories, according to their focus on 'five core causal processes . . . institutions, networks, socioeconomic process, choices, and ideas', it is now difficult to distinguish between at least two of those concepts. Second, the identification of a large number of approaches to 'new institutionalism' shows us that, under the surface of a shared concept, there is a huge amount of terminological confusion and debate (for reviews, see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2011) . Most notably, there is much debate about the nature of institutions as the rules and norms that influence behaviour: for some, they almost represent structures that bind behaviour (March & Olsen, 2006, p. 3) ; for others, they exist largely in the minds of individuals (Ostrom, 2007, p. 23) or socialized practices of groups (Rhodes, 2006, p. 91) and, as such, are relatively open to the potential of challenge or change. Indeed, Mark Bevir rejected the use of the word 'institution' altogether (at a Political Studies Association Seminar, Manchester, 2009) because it has a 'bewitching effect' ('Don't call practices institutions!'). As Cairney (2012, p. 75) argues, 'This difference in language may seem trivial, but it highlights important debates which often divide the discipline. ' 'Paradigm' could also be used to describe a type of policy subsystem. In particular, the hegemonic aspect of policy paradigms would suggest that the policy subsystem were controlled by a policy monopoly attempting to keep issues off the 'macropolitical' agenda by utilizing strategies of dominant framing of policy issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993 Jones & Baumgartner, 2005) . Indeed, when discussing the many similarities between his and Hall's work, Baumgartner (2013, p. 251) tries to clarify this connection: 'When ideas are widely shared by an entire policy community, they can be called a paradigm. Some policy communities may well be dominated by a single paradigm, others may see competition, and others may see the replacement of one dominant paradigm by another.' So, for Baumgartner (2014, p. 476) , paradigms relate to the 'grand' or 'fundamental' aspects of systems. This distinction is crucial, since a system-wide paradigm suggests that all participants operate within a common discursive framework, while a subsystem focus suggests that the system contains a large number of competing frames in different subsystems (or, perhaps, frames that are supported by different groups in competition with each other), which either operate independently of each other or occasionally combine to produce new subsystem arrangements.
However, in this respect, Hall's use of policy paradigm is not always clear. Hall (1993, pp. 276, 288) focuses generally on 'the political system as a whole' -'defined as the complex of political parties and interest intermediaries that stand at the intersection between the state and society in democratic polities' -and furthers his argument with a focus on the cross-cutting area of economic policy. However, he also suggests that the maintenance of an economic paradigm allows routine aspects of policymaking (producing 'first' and 'second order' change) to be 'relatively insulated from the kind of pluralist pressures we often associate with the broader political system ' (1993, p. 281 ). Hall's (1993, p. 279) initial focus is on the contribution of policy paradigms to ' normal' policymaking, which involves policy continuity and non-radical change and the maintenance of a dominant way of thinking about the world. He draws on Kuhn's (1962) model of scientific progress, which suggests that natural science is conducted and evaluated by communities who share a single, common, view of the world, and rarely go back to 'first principles' to question the assumptions on which their theories and models are built (unlike social science, in which there is more competition to explain the world).
Given the different definitions of ideas and paradigms, there are some general interpretations that offer a basis for further discussions. First, ideas are best interpreted as an umbrella concept or category of concepts that involves a variety of mental constructs that operate differently in the politics of policy processes. Second, policy paradigms are more of a system-based concept that, if recognized, are generally agreed upon, may represent an underlying implicit gestalt or explicit structure of the system, and are drawn originally from ideas. Third, ideas and policy paradigms are related in that any paradigm consists of realized or translated ideas but not all ideas are associated with policy paradigms.
Descriptions and explanations of paradigmatic change
Hall's description of paradigmatic policy change has three orders. At the most profound level is Hall's (1993, p. 280 ) identification of 'third order' (paradigmatic) change, which has three main elements: 'the power of one set of actors to impose its paradigm over others'; a shift in authority in the political system; and, policy failure associated with the failure of experts to explain and solve the problem. In other words, there is widespread attention to cumulative policy failure, and either a new government takes over and introduces radically different policies, or existing policymakers reject the advice of one set of experts in favour of another (Cairney, 2012, p. 229) . In the case of the United Kingdom's economic policy, paradigm change followed the decision by elected governmentsand the Thatcher governments in particular -to draw on monetarist ideas put forward by international economists (and championed by key political and media figures) and challenge the dominance of Keynesian expertise within the Treasury (Hall, 1993, p. 287) . This analysis served to reinforce the argument that 'ideas matter' because the monetarist paradigm became a resource for Thatcher and key ministers to use, to challenge the economic orthodoxy within the government's civil servicean option not available to Edward Heath, who set off on a similar path in the early 1970s before making a famous 'U turn' (Hall, 1993, p. 290) .
Hall contrasts this event with the more routine 'first' or 'second order' policymaking that takes place within an existing paradigm when its participants do not question the rationale for policy goals. It compares with Kuhn's (1962) model of scientific progress which identifies a similar process in which scientists take their paradigm for granted for long spells, only to face major crises in key eras. Kuhn suggests that scientific advances have not been incremental or based on the linear accumulation of knowledge. Rather, when communities of experts fail to provide further scientific advance, they are overtaken and replaced by other communities with different ideas and ways of thinking. This is often caused by a crisis prompted by new information and the inability of scientists to explain why the world does not work in the way they think it does.
The policymaking equivalent is a political crisis prompted by policy failure, calling into question the thinking behind policy and undermining the status of its advocates (Cairney, 2012, p. 230) . It produces a battle of ideas, which only ends 'when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policymaking and are able to rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new paradigm' (Hall, 1993, p. 281) . As Wilder discusses, in this volume, there is little room for compromise in this process if, as suggested by Kuhn, competing paradigms are 'incommensurable'; if the move from one world view to another involves a 'gestalt switch' 'akin to ideological or religious conversion', Hall's (1993, p. 280 ) emphasis is slightly different: 'paradigms are by definition never fully commensurable'. Rather, one scientific or policymaking community replaces another. In science, this may take decades, as one generation is replaced by another. In policymaking, generational change can be much faster (Cairney, 2013, pp. 290-1; Hall, 1993, p. 280) .
The occurrence of paradigmatic policy change suggests some combination of three elements: a profound shift in the context in which policy debates take place; a profound shift in the way that policymakers think and act; and, as a result, major policy change. There is general agreement that it is rare. Yet, we need to be careful about at least two aspects.
First, the literature tends to distinguish between a decision to make policy differently and the longer term outcomes of those decisions. Policy change can be major by one measure and minor by another. So, can we identify paradigmatic policy change from the point of initial decision to do things differently, or only after we measure its long-term effect?
Second, this is a specific kind of major policy change, measured or characterized in terms of the extent to which new policy, and policymaking arrangements, diverged from, or contradicted, the old. Paradigmatic policy change suggests that a complete rethink by policymakers produced a complete shift in policy direction. It may also imply a 'big bang' or event which signals that clear shift. This is not the same as, for example, a gradual and cumulative shift in a new direction, or major change in terms of a massive new commitment to the same direction (the latter was often signposted by Lindblom [1964, p. 157 
] as a possibility).
More recent studies consider whether we can talk meaningfully of paradigmatic change in the absence of a big bang or event (Béland & Cox, 2010; Blyth, 2002, p. 7; Goetz & Howlett, 2012; Hay & Wincott, 1998; Schmidt, 2010) . There are also numerous terms -including 'gradual change with transformative results' (Streeck & Thelen, 2005 , p. 9), 'punctuated evolution' (Hay, 2002, p. 163) , 'gradual but profound' third order change unaccompanied by crisis (Palier, 2005, p. 129) , and 'phased transition towards paradigm change' (Studlar & Cairney, 2014 ) -which identify a profound shift in institutions (or perhaps organizations), beliefs, and policy over such a long period of time that it is difficult to talk of change linked to one event or a short era. Such discussions challenge the idea that paradigm change necessarily involves a profound and quick burst of change in institutions or policy. Yet, the problem is that no study is clear on how long is long or how quick is quick.
These issues are not unique to Hall's work. They can also be identified in studies, such as punctuated equilibrium theory and multiple streams analysis, grouped under the term 'evolutionary theory' (Cairney, 2013) . For example, similar questions have been raised about the meaning, categorization, and measurement of policy punctuations (see John & Bevan, 2012 , part of a special issue on punctuated equilibrium in Policy Studies Journal, 40, 1). There is also much disagreement about how to conceptualize evolutionary change (is it gradual or punctuated?) but, in that context, remarkably high agreement about how long 'evolutionary' policy change takes -largely because key authors identify the potential for huge variation. For example, Kingdon's (1984, pp. 122-36) range is 'a while' to 'a few years' to 'twenty-five years' (see Cairney, 2013, p. 12; Studlar & Cairney, 2014, p. 4) . In more general terms, the identification and measurement of 'major policy change' is still problematic (Cairney, 2012, pp. 29-30) . So too is the general idea of policy 'direction', which is yet another metaphor, difficult to identify and operationalize (unless an actor performs a 'U turn' to return to a previous policy).
One further complication: Variation by policy issue
One thing that might set Hall's work apart from many others is his primary object of study -economic policy in the UK -and the extent to which comparable approaches study the same thing. For example, Baumgartner and Jones' (1993) early work focused on issues such as nuclear power, pesticides, and tobacco, while the ACF has its roots in studies of environmental issues -and both developed from studies of the United States. It may be that the identification of paradigms is more straightforward in economic policy than in other policy fields, partly because economics as a discipline is often modelled closely on the natural sciences, its professionals are often trained in particular subfields, and it makes sense to suggest that Keynesian and monetarist economists had incommensurable understandings about how the world worked (Hall, 1993, p. 284) .
As Hall (1993, p. 290) suggests, this kind of outcome may be a common feature of areas 'where policymaking involves some highly technical issues and a body of specialized knowledge pertaining to them', but there seem to be areas -such as environmental and tobacco policywhere a large scientific consensus develops over time, and more debate revolves around how to frame and address the problem than define it technically, or in terms of cause and effect. Consequently, for example, Studlar and Cairney (2014) identify phases of change because the scientific evidence on tobacco was accepted more or less in different government departments, but there was a more gradual acceptance of the need to change policy markedly to reflect the weight of the evidence. In other words, the definition of the problem and production of solutions were often very separate processes.
Overview of the Advocacy Coalition Framework
The ACF is an approach for guiding research in principal areas of coalitions, learning, and policy change. The framework was originally developed in the early 1980s and has continuously evolved over time through empirical applications and updates and revisions to the framework and its theoretical emphases. A detailed summary of the ACF is not feasible in this chapter; instead only the concepts and theories within the ACF are presented to inform the comparison with Hall's paradigm and ideas. For further descriptions of the ACF, see Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) .
As a research guide, the ACF starts from several foundational assumptions, three of which are relevant to the current discussion and involve individuals, subsystems, and policies. First, the ACF assumes individuals are bounded rational and principally guided by a belief system. This belief system is a three-tiered mental model that includes normative/ ontological values called deep core beliefs, normative and empirical beliefs central to a policy subsystem called policy core beliefs, and instrumental beliefs for achieving policy core belief goals called secondary beliefs. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999, p. 133 ) provide a list of potential belief system components per belief system level including, but not limited to: (1) sociocultural identity, whose welfare counts, view of human nature, and priorities associated with basic values for deep core beliefs; (2) problem perceptions, general policy solutions, causal understandings, priorities for distribution of authority, and priorities associated with policy instruments that span a policy subsystem as part of policy core beliefs; and (3) instrumental decisions or beliefs related to a subset of a subsystem as part of secondary beliefs. To address their cognitive constraints, individuals rely upon their belief system to filter, interpret, understand, and distort reality as well as to shape their networks and, hence, the structure of coalitions. For scholars seeking to apply the ACF, the three-tiered belief system and the belief system components offer a broad but useful guide in conducting their research and in testing hypotheses.
Second, the principal unit of analysis for studying policy processes is the policy subsystem. Policy subsystems are defined by a topical area, a geographic territory, and the policy actors involved. Policy subsystems can occur at any level of government from local to national and can occur cross-nationally. Policy subsystems are also nested and overlapping and semi-autonomous. They may involve officials from any level of government and non-government policy actors including those from the private sector, non-profits, academia, consulting firms, the news media, engaged citizens, and possibly others.
Third, public policies are conceptualized as translations of belief systems of the coalition or coalitions whose members negotiated and formulated it. This is one of the reasons why coalition politics are so contentious; it involves debates about translating normative and empirical beliefs into practice.
Relating ACF and paradigms and ideas
Pragmatically, Hall (1993) and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) were describing a very similar phenomenon in part to understand behaviour and motivation. Consequently, Hall's definition of ideas and paradigms looks a lot like the definitions of belief systems and policy subsystems in the ACF. However, it is critically important to explore the differences at a deeper level of sophistication.
The differences begin with the role of the individual. In Hall's (1993) work, the role of the individual in relation to ideas and paradigms is ambiguous and the gestalt emphasis suggests that agency exists at the collective level. As such, questions have been asked about whether ideas exist outside of individuals (Baumgartner, 2014) . In contrast, the ACF is grounded in a modified depiction of methodological individualism; that is, individuals have agency-given contextual constraints and opportunities. Thus, belief systems and learning exist only at the individual level. When a phrase like a 'coalition belief system' is mentioned, the term 'coalition' is used metaphorically or for convenience because coalitions do not have beliefs -only individuals do. Therefore, a single, coherent belief system that operates at the coalition or subsystem level does not exist in the ACF. This does not mean that a researcher cannot measure or describe the belief system attributes that might pervade a coalition or dominate a policy subsystem; indeed, this is exactly what happens when mapping the political landscape of a policy subsystem and the agreements and disagreements of belief systems aggregated from individuals involved. However, in studying belief systems of collectives, it is recognized, sometimes implicitly, that the origins of belief systems occur only within individuals involved in the policy subsystem.
As a point of comparison, the distinction is important for at least two reasons. First, in the ACF, for example, the relationship between belief systems and individuals is not a conceptual or theoretical debate, and time and energy are not spent in clarifying the relationship as is done in trying to understand ideas and individuals (Baumgartner, 2014; Daigneault, 2014) . Second, in the ACF, agency is clear. Individuals make change or stasis happens. Their action might be in reaction to events or information, they often operate in tandem with their organizations, and they are definitely affected by their contextual settings, but only individuals have agency. In Hall's work, or at least in the way it is often interpreted, the point of agency is less unclear and could exist within individuals or from the whole. The explanation for stasis or change could relate to individuals or to ideas. Thus, the causal driver in the ACF is individuals and their belief systems; the same causal driver in the broader literature on ideas and paradigms is much more difficult to identify. In Daigneault's (2014, p. 454 ) the 'bearers of ideas' are often neglected.
Another point of similarity and subtle differences relates to ideas and belief systems. For Hall (1993) , a common interpretation of ideas is one of an umbrella concept that can refer to any mental construct, including beliefs, values, and knowledge. In this broad sense, ideas resemble the belief components of the ACF. However, a belief system is not an umbrella concept category. It is an integrated three-tiered model with components that are interrelated. Aspects of the ACF's belief system can be measured, hypotheses about the belief systems components can be empirically tested, and belief systems can be compared. In the work inspiring Hall, and advanced by Hall, there is no equivalent sense of how to operationalize the concept of ideas -and this is one of the reasons why ideas as a category do not offer much theoretical guidance or insights for explaining change and stasis in policy processes.
Similarly, it appears that there are parallels between the ACF and Hall's work with regard to their depiction of public policies. Public policies, as written by individuals, are depicted as translations of belief systems in the ACF. This matches some interpretations of Hall's work of policies as 'revealed ideas' (Daigneault, 2014, p. 459) . Given this interpretation of policy, however, the ACF offers an extra benefit based on its belief system model in conceptualizing minor and major change in public policy.
Both the ACF and Hall (1993) have descriptions of policy change. For the ACF, policy change comes in two forms. The first is minor policy change, which is equated with changes in the secondary aspects of the policy subsystem, such as a change in the instruments for achieving the same goal. Given that policies are translations of beliefs, minor policy change is associated with changes in secondary beliefs of a belief system. Minor policy change in the ACF is equivalent to Hall's first and second order paradigmatic policy change. The second is major change, which is equated with changes in the policy core aspects of the policy subsystem, which may (but not necessarily) involve changes in goals. Major policy change is associated with changes in the policy core beliefs of a belief system. Major policy change in the ACF is equivalent to Hall's third order paradigmatic policy change, at least in definition. However, the ACF differs in that there can be major policy change in a policy subsystem but, given that a policy subsystem consists of multiple policies, there might not be a complete paradigmatic makeover. In this regard, major policy change is not the same in practice as the paradigmatic policy change implies. For example, there can be major policy change that radically alters the distribution of resources in a policy subsystem, but the goals of the policy subsystem remain the same.
To compare policy change in the ACF and paradigmatic policy change in Hall's (1993) work meaningfully requires us to define the policy paradigm concept and translate policy paradigms into the lexicon and theory of the ACF. A direct translation of policy paradigms does not exist in the ACF. One might expect that some policy subsystems are more coherent in their policies than others, or that some policy subsystems might be controlled by a single dominant coalition supported by members with very similar belief systems. The latter is the analogy that Baumgartner used in relating policy paradigms to the policy image purported by a policy monopoly. At the same time, this interpretation differs, as belief systems are what binds coalitions together and are not the subsurface, underlying, and fundamental force that shapes world views, language, and culture, which is one of the main interpretations of policy paradigms. In this regard, equating policy paradigms to the shared components of the belief systems of individuals in the dominant coalition undervalues the indirect and implicit gestalt power of policy paradigms, which is possibly one of the strongest interpretations of Hall's argument. This is one situation where the search for similarities and likeness leads to a loss of the critical nuances and details that make a particular theory interesting and important in contributing to our understanding of policy processes.
Putting the differences aside, assume for the sake of argument that paradigmatic policy change is a sweeping subsystem or system level change of beliefs, policy, or both. Policy paradigm change could be equated with the ACF as a changeover of one dominant coalition to another dominant coalition. With the exception of revolutions, where one dominant coalition is completely removed and replaced with a rival dominant coalition, such sweeping change is rare. More likely, a dominant coalition and its associated policy paradigm would crumble, a dominant coalition would be replaced with two or more adversarial advocacy coalitions, and perhaps another or the same dominant coalition would again reemerge. Such a process would take decades to centuries and, on smaller scale, has been described previously by Weible (2008) . If such a comparison were made, the lesson would be that paradigmatic policy change is extremely rare and most likely takes decades or longer. In this sense, the description and theoretical arguments about policy change in the ACF are distinct from Hall's paradigmatic policy change because of the temporal differences and potential differences in magnitude.
Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a meaningful exploration of the similarities and differences between Hall's (1993) paradigms and ideas and the ACF. The field can benefit from thoughtful interpretations and comparisons of different approaches, which we hope was illustrated by this chapter. The underlying rationale of this chapter is that policy process research deals with complexity that defies the emergence of universal theories of the policy process and that requires careful conceptualization and creation of causal theories.
In this exploration, we found some similarities. For example, Hall's ideas and the belief components that comprise the ACF's belief system are similar. However, we found far more differences: the structure of ACF's belief system is absent from Hall's category of ideas; ACF's major policy change is most distinct from paradigmatic policy change; agency lies within individuals in the ACF but is more ambiguous for Hall (or, at least, the literature in which Hall's work can be situated); and the policy paradigm concept does not exist, in a meaningful way, in the ACF. Blurring these differences is to overlook the current descriptions and explanations for behavioural change and stasis in both approaches. The descriptions and explanations that exist in both theories are what must be developed if both approaches have any hope in making significant advances to the study of policy processes.
Thus, explorations as done in this chapter should be done not just to combine or integrate different approaches for the sake of finding common ground, but also for appreciating the differences, recognizing the differences in vocabularies and research approaches, and developing strategies for advancing the field. Perhaps in time some theoretical integration might occur but any such integration -if it were possible and fruitful -absolutely must begin with deliberate and accurate attempts at understanding the differences, which are far too often overlooked. While the purpose of this chapter has been to explore the relationship between the ACF, ideas, and policy paradigms, undoubtedly other interpretations exist and can be put forward.
